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Summary findings
Using panel data from a unique survey of public primary  sociopolitical endowment. Rather than being passive
schools in Uganda, Reinikka and Svensson assess the  recipients of flows from government, schools use their
degree of leakage of public funds in education. The  bargaining power relative to other parts of government
survey data reveal that on average during 1991-95  to secure greater shares of funding. Public resources are
schools received only 13 percent of the central  therefore not allocated according to the rules underlying
government's  allocation for the schools' nonwage  the government's  budget decisions, with obvious equity
expenditures. Most of the allocated funds were used by  and efficiency implications.
public officials for purposes unrelated to education or  The survey findings had a direct impact on policy in
captured  for private gain (leakage).  Uganda. As evidence on the degree of leakage became
The survey data also reveal large variations in leakage  public knowledge, the central government enacted a
across schools. A small set of school-specific variables can  number of changes: it began publishing monthly transfers
explain a significant part of this variation. Specifically,  of public funds to the districts in newspapers,
the authors find that larger schools receive a larger share  broadcasting them on radio, and requiring schools to
of the intended funds per student.  Schools with children  post information on inflow of funds. An initial
of wealthier parents also experience a lower degree of  assessment of these reforms shows that the flow of funds
leakage, while schools with a higher share of unqualified  improved dramatically, from 13 percent on average
teachers receive less. After addressing potential selection  reaching schools in 1991-95  to around 90 percent in
and measurement issues, the authors  show that these  1999. These improvements emphasize the role of
school characteristics have a quantitatively large impact  information  in mobilizing "voice" for better public
on the degree of leakage.  expenditure  outcomes.
The findings are consistent with the view that resource
flows-and  leakage-are  endogenous to schools'
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Data  on official budget  allocations are typically  the only source of information  on public
spending in low-income countries.  Unfortunately, such information poorly predicts what the
intended beneficiaries actually receive in terms of resources and services. This is particularly
so in  countries with  weak institutions.  Surveying the supply  side of service delivery can
provide a  useful  reality  check.  In  this  paper  we describe  and  analyze  the  results  of an
innovative survey tool implemented in Uganda to gauge the extent  to which public resources
actually filter down to the intended facilities. The survey compared disbursed flows from the
central government (intended resources) with the resources actually received by 250 primary
schools over a five-year period  (1991-95). This unique panel data  set let us study the level
and determinants  of leakage.
The  results  of the  survey are striking.  On average,  schools received only  13 percent
of central  government  allocations  toward  their  non-wage expenditures.  The  bulk  of the
allocated  spending  did  not  reach  the  intended  beneficiaries and  was either  used  by local
government officials  for purposes unrelated to education or captured  for private gain (defined
as leakage).
The  survey data  also reveal large variations  in  leakage across schools.  We develop a
simple bargaining  model to  explain  these differences.  In the  model,  resource flows-and
leakage-are  endogenous to school characteristics, as schools use their bargaining power vis-
a-vis other parts  of government to  secure greater  shares  of funding.  These resources are
therefore not allocated according to the rules underlying the government's budget decisions,
with obvious equity and efficiency implications.
The  model's  predictions  are confirmed  by the  data.  Specifically, we find that  larger
schools receive a  larger share of the intended  funds  (per  student).  Schools with  children
of wealthier parents  also experience a lower degree of leakage, while schools with  a higher
share  of unqualified teachers  experience less leakage.  After  addressing  potential  selection
and measurement issues, we find that  these school characteristics have a quantitatively  large
impact on the degree of leakage.
The survey findings prompted  a strong response from the  central government: it began
publishing the monthly transfers of public funds to the districts in newspapers, broadcasting
the transfers on radio, and requiring primary schools to post information on inflows of funds
for all to see.  This not  only lowered the information costs to parents  and schools, but  also
signaled local government.  An initial assessment of these reforms a  few years later  shows
that  the flow of funds improved dramatically, from 13 percent  (on average) reaching schools
in  1991-95 to over 95 percent  of intended  capitation  grants  reaching schools in  1999. The
findings of the paper extend  the emerging empirical literature  on school funding  (or more
generally public goods provision) in developing countries.'  Miguel (2000) shows that  higher
'The literature on school funding in developed countries is large, particularly in the United States (see
for instance Fernandez  and Rogerson, 1996,  and references  given therein).  Most of this literature explains
the actual educational expenditures per student financed at the local level. This paper explores the extent
1ethnic diversity is associated with sharply lower primary school funding (school fees collected
from parents and local fund-raisers), and worse school-level  facilities in western Kenya. sug-
gesting that  collective action problems may be more severe in the presence of greater cultural
and linguistic differences. We focus instead on central government funding for schools and
the influence of local political and socioeconomic factors on the actual outcomes. Although
our study  does not  have information on ethnicity, it suggests that  adverse effects of ethnic
diversity on private school funding could be magnified by lower public funding through  the
reduced bargaining power of schools in ethnically diverse areas.
To the extent  diverted  funds are used for private gain (by district  officials), this paper
also provides,  to  our knowledge, the  first quantitative  attempt  to  systematically  measure
corruption  in basic service delivery systems.  Our findings provide new insight into an area
almost exclusively studied using cross-country data.2 We show that  a large part of the varia-
tion in corruption at the local level can be explained by studying the interaction  between the
local officials and the end-users (schools) as a bargaining game. From an analytical point of
view our approach differs from much of the existing literature  on corruption, since we focus
on the principal's  (the school's) rather  than the agent's  (the district  officials') incentives and
constraints.  Our results  suggest that  a systematic effort to  increase the  ability of citizens
to  monitor  and  challenge abuses  of the  system,  and  inform  them  about  their  rights  and
erntitlements, are important  aspects in controlling corruption.
The  results  of the  paper  also  have implications  for the  large  cross-country  literature
oIL  public spending  and  growth in  developing countries,  as  well as the  literature  on  the
macroeconomic impact of foreign aid. In particular,  our findings highlight the identification
pioblem  in  attempting  to  evaluate  the  efficacy of public  capital  or  services with  public
spending  data.3 Given the  extent  of and  variation  in  leakage, using  central  government
budget allocation data to assess the impact of public spending on growth and social outcomes
wi11  severely underestimate  any potential  positive effect that  the public capital  or services
actually  created by public funds can have.  Based on the  existing cross-country  work, the
effect of government spending  on growth and social development outcomes is ambiguous. 4
Our results  suggest that  increased  spending  does not  necessarily  translate  into increased
output  and services. 5
to which centrally  financed educational  expenditures  are diverted at  the  local government  level.
2For effects of corruption  on investment and growth see Mauro (1995). On the determinants  of corruption,
see Ades and  Di Tella (1997, 1999), Persson,  Tabellini, and Trebbi  (2000), Svensson (2000a), and  Treisman
(2000).  A  common theme  in  this  literature  is the  use  of  subjective  measures  of  corruption  in  a  cross-
colntry  setting.  Fisman  and  Svensson (2000), Svensson (2000b), and  Di Tella and  Schargrodsky  (2000) are
exceptions.  They use quantitative  micro-level data  on corruption.
3Pritchett  (1996), Reinikka and  Svensson (2001) make a similar argument.
4Ram (1986) and  Kormendi  and  Mequire  (1985) find  higher government  expenditures  associated  with
high growth, while Landau  (1986), Barro (1991), Dowrick (1992), and Alesina (1997), find higher government
expenditures  associated with lower growth.  Levine and  Renelt  (1992) show that  government expenditures  is
not a robust  (partial)  correlate  of growth.
'The  empirical growth literature  is abundant  with explicit (and implicit)  attempts  to separate  productive
spending  from expenditures  that  have no direct effect on productivity  (for example by  ex ante determining
2In  a  similar  vein, the  recent  literature  on the  macroeconomic impact  of aid finds no
statistical  relationship  between  aid  and  growth  or social development  outcomes  (Boone,
1995, 1996). 6Our results  provide a possible explanation  for this finding.  Since foreign aid
is typically intermediated  through  the recipient's  public sector,  it is bound  to suffer from
similar deficiencies. If a large fraction of foreign aid does not  result in actual  public assets
and services, a low correlation between aid and  outcomes is to be expected.
The rest  of this  paper  is structured  as follows. The next  section briefly reviews the in-
stitutional  setting for school finance and decisionmaking in Uganda.  Section 3 discusses the
survey and the  measurement  of leakage.  Section 4 sets out  a simple bargaining  model to
investigate the relationship between school-related characteristics and  expenditure leakage,
whereas section 5 explores extensions to the model. Section 6 describes the empirical speci-
fication of the model that  we use to examine leakage across schools and discusses the data.
The results  are presented in section 7. Section 8 concludes.
2.  Institutional  setting
It is commonly held that  Uganda  had a well-functioning public service delivery system in
the 1960s. The government response to the political and military  turmoil of the 1970s and
early 1980s was to de facto retreat  from funding and providing public services. In primary
education parents gradually took over running  the public schools. The survey data  indicate
that  by 1991 this situation  had not  changed much.  Parent-teacher  associations  (PTA) were
the primary  decisionmakers at the school level, and funding by parents  was on average the
most important  source of income.
While the subsequent economic recovery increased public spending relatively rapidly, in-
stitutional  reforms were much slower  to come. In particular,  the central government exercised
weak oversight over the local governments (districts),  which channeled public funding to the
social sectors.  District officials thus had discretion over how to use public funds supposedly
earmarked for the schools.
During the  survey period  (1991-95) the central  government's financial contribution  to
primary education was threefold.  First,  the Ministry  of Education  paid salaries of primary
school teachers either directly, if the teacher had  a bank account, or most often through the
district  education officer and/or  the headmaster.  Second, the Ministry of Local Government
transferred  a capitation  grant per enrolled student  to  the district  administrations  for non-
wage expenditures  like textbooks, instructional  materials, and  the costs of running  schools.
Capitation  grants  were not  politicized in  the  sense that  districts  did  not  receive varying
amounts by the central ministry, but  a nationally set allocation per student per year. These
what types of spending  are likely  to be productive,  see Barro, 1991). Unfortunately,  partitioning expenditure
categories  does not address the core problem-that  public funds may not reach the intended end-user.
6Burnside and Dollar (2000) and Svensson (1998), find similar unconditional results, but  a positive
relationship between  aid and growth conditional  on the recipient's policies (institutions). Hansen and Tarp
(2001),  using different  methods, find a weakly  positive  relationship between aid and growth.
3grants were managed by the districts on behalf of the central government.  Third, the central
government  provided funding  for capital  expenditure  also through  the  Ministry  of Local
Government.  This  funding  was limited  almost  entirely to  rehabilitation.  In fact,  since
the  1970s the  central government had  virtually abandoned  its  responsibility  for classroom
construction.  In  principle, the  provision of classrooms became the  responsibility  of local
governments which passed it on to parents.7
The central government's total  contribution to the funding of primary schools more than
doubled between 1991 and  1995 in real terms, albeit from a negligible base  (Table 2.1).  In
practice the entire increase was used to raise teachers' salaries, which had eroded to extremely
low levels (equivalent to a few U.S. dollars a month) during the institutional  and economic
collapse of the  1970s and  1980s.  The capitation  grant was retained  at  the  same nominal
level throughout  the survey period,  therefore,  its real value actually  declined.  There  was
an increase in rehabilitation  and school construction  spending toward the end of the survey
period.
The central  government's stated  policy was to disburse capitation  grants  in full tc  the
schools through  the local government (districts).  The grant was set in 1991 at the nominal
rate of Ush 2,500 per child enrolled in grades one to four and  Ush 4,000 per child enrolled
in grades five to  seven.  These nominal  rates remained the  same until  1997. According to
anecdotal evidence, the grants often ended up in the chief administrative  officer's account in
thte district,  and that  the latter did not necessarily transfer the funds onward to the district
education  officer as was expected.  There  are also many anecdotes  about  highly inflated
prices for school supplies procured  by district  officials, meaning  little  (either  in  monetary
terms or in-kind) was received by schools.
Uganda  implemented cash  budgeting  in  1992, which in many  cases produced  volatile
monthly releases of funds from the Treasury. However,  as part of the World Bank's structural
adjustment  programs  non-wage recurrent  expenditures  for primary  education  were given
priority program status,  which protected  schools from within-year  budget cuts.  Capitation
grants were fully released by the center to the districts on a monthly basis.  In the Ugandan
treasury  system, central  ministries  were unlikely to  capture  releases to  local governments
because they were subjected  to relatively  elaborate pre-audit  procedures.  Hence, from the
spending program or agency perspective,  the  uncertainty  of funding was greatest  pricr  to
the release. Released funds were very likely to arrive at their intended  destination,  which in
the case of capitation  grants was the district.
The  central government  policy regarding  the  capitation  grant  was not  well-known to
parents,  particularly  outside the  capital  city.  Even if parents  knew  about  the  policy  in
principle, many similar policy statements  were not  implemented  in practice  at that  time.
Little information was available to the public, for example, on the spending items protected
within the cash budget system.  This worked well for the  districts  taking  advantage of the
71n addition,  central  government  is responsible  for a share of the cost of donor-financed  development
projects (about 10 percent of the total project cost). It also incurs expenditure on teacher training, exami-
nations, and school  inspection. The latter was almost non-existent during the survey period.
4asymmetric  information about  school funding; these districts  could reduce disbursements
or procure little  for non-wage items to  schools because  they knew such action  would not
attract  political  attention.  By contrast,  failure to  pay  teachers'  salaries  attracted  much
more attention  as, not surprisingly, teachers knew what  their salaries were.
As Table 2.1 shows, parental  contributions  toward primary  education consisted of PTA
levies for investment  and  recurrent  costs,  top-ups  to  teachers'  salaries,  and  tuition  fees.
The PTA fees and top-ups to teachers'  salaries were entirely school-specific  and set by each
school's PTA, depending on the parents' ability to pay and the needs of the school. Parental
contributions were clearly the mainstay of finance in government-aided primary schools. On
average, during the  sample period, parental  contributions  accounted for over 60 percent of
total  school income.  In per-student  terms, parents'  average contribution  increased by 35
percent in real terms during the sample period. Interviews at primary schools indicated that
the parents  who were not  able to  pay the agreed PTA fees were often alienated  and  even
forced to take their  children out of the school.
In theory, the tuition  fee per student was set by the central government at the same level
as the  (matching) capitation  grant.  It  was left to each district  to  determine how the funds
raised  through  tuition  fees should be  redistributed  among the schools.  In some districts
the schools were allowed to retain  a certain percentage or a fixed amount  of the tuition  fee
collected per student, with the balance transferred  to the district  education officer. In other
districts all tuition  fees collected were remitted  to the district  headquarters  and subsequent
onward disbursements  to  schools, either  in  cash or  in-kind,  may or  may not  have taken
place. The efficiency of tuition  fee collection was very low in 1991, but  improved somewhat
in subsequent years.  Interviews at  the schools suggested that  low collection efficiency was
due to adverse incentive: most  schools were neither allowed to keep the collected funds, nor
benefited from them in any other way.
Teacher recruitment  was carried out by district education service committees on behalf of
the national teacher service commission. Recruitment  was supply driven, as all new teachers
graduating  from the primary  teacher collages were usually hired.  Although  teachers were
hired by the districts,  their payroll was maintained  by the central government.  As a result,
and  contrary  to  non-wage spending,  the  central  government  provided some oversight for
teacher recruitment  and  salaries through  the  maintenance  of the  national  payroll.  Once
recruited, the district education officer posted the teacher to a specific school. Hence teachers
had little opportunity  to choose the school where they taught.  If the demand for teachers
exceeded the  supply  of training  colleges, district  education  service committees  recruited
additional "licensed" teachers, who were often unqualified.
The  PTA  derived its  authority  from parents.  The  influence of the  PTA over district
officials depended on their competence to articulate  their  case.  A typical PTA was run by
an executive committee that  had  about  six members elected during a general meeting, and
the headmaster.  According to anecdotal evidence it was common for influential and better-off
parents who were close to the school establishment  to serve on the executive committee.
Most students had few schools within a walking distance, particularly  in rural areas. This
5lack of choice can be traced  back to the tumult  of the 1970s and early 1980s and the central
government's gradual abandonment of school construction  which the local governments were
not  able to  pick up.  School choice was also limited  by Uganda's preference for "complete
schools" (one school offering all seven grades) dating back to the colonial times.
3.  Can  leakage  be  measured?
Ideally, the public accounting system provides timely information about  actual spending on
various budget  items and programs,  and the reports  accurately  capture  what  the intended
users receive. This is not often the case in low-income countries.  Typically the accounting
system functions poorly, institutions  enhancing local accountability are weak, and there are
few (if any) incentives to maintain  adequate records at different levels of government.  Con-
sequently, little is known about the process of transforming budget allocations into services
within most sectors.
These observations formed the basis for designing a new survey tool-a  quantitative  ser-
vice delivery survey8-to  gauge the extent to which public resources actually filtered down to
the intended facilities. A survey covering 250 government primary schools was implemented
in 1996, covering the period 1991-95 (see Reinikka, 2001, for details  on survey design).  At
the time of the survey, about 8,500 government primary  schools were supposed to receive a
large proportion of their funding from the central government via district  administrations.9
The objective of the survey was twofold. First, to measure the difference between intended
resources (from central government) and resources actually received (by the school). Second,
to collect quantitative  data  on service delivery at the frontline  (i.e., the schools).
The  initial intention  to  track  all main  spending  categories through  the entire  delivery
system, that  is, the central government, districts, and schools, was not possible due to several
deficiencies in the system.  First,  at  the central government  level, data  were not  available
on salaries paid to  primary  school teachers either  by district  or by school.  The  only data
available at  the time  of the  survey were the  aggregate salary payments,  lumping  together
payments to teachers  in primary, secondary, and  tertiary  levels, as well as to non-teaching
staff.  This  made  systematic  comparison between budget  allocations  and  actual  spending
at the school level impossible with respect  to  teachers'  salaries.  Because salary data  was
lacking or incomplete, we used systematic spending data on per-student  capitation  grants for
non-wage spending available at the central government level as our core variable on intended
funds.  Second, the district-level records (for both non-wage and wage spending)  were much
worse than  those  at  the  central  government  level.  The  quality  of available  information
bcth  on transfers  from the center and  disbursements  to  schools was so poor that  districts
sirmply  had to be excluded from the expenditure  tracking exercise.  Unlike primary  schools,
'For a conceptual  discussion  on Quantitative Service  Delivery  Surveys (QSDS) and reference  to ongoing
survey work, see Dehn, Reinikka  and Svensson  (2001).
9The 1,500  private or community schools  were not included  in the survey.
6some districts were also quite  uncooperative during the survey exercise.  School records, on
the other hand,  were relatively comprehensive.  Thus,  a detailed  comparison of budgetary
allocations and actual spending could be made between the central government outlays for
non-wage spending on instructional  materials  and  other running  costs and  the equivalent
school income.
We believe the  capitation  grant  data  at  the school level adequately  capture  what  the
schools receive for several reasons.  First, the data collected directly from the school records
were kept for the school's own needs.  The school records were not  submitted  to any district
or central  authorities  and  were not  the  basis for current  or  future  funding.  Thus,  there
were no obvious incentives to  misrecord the  data.  The concern  that  headmasters  might
have underreported  school income in order to extract  resources for themselves was allayed
after  interviews during  the  survey work, which did  not  support  this  possibility.  This is
not  surprising since the  PTA  was typically  the principal  decisionmaker  (and  responsible
for raising most of the  income) at  the school.  Furthermore,  parents  who contributed  the
majority  of school income presumably  demanded  financial information  and  accountability
from the school (or PTA).
The central government simply assumed the funds reached schools. Audit systems at the
center  and local governments were weak, and  there  was little  interest  in ascertaining how
the funds were actually  used.  The school survey brought  out  issues about the relationship
between school authorities  and district  education officers for the first time.
Our school specific measure of degree of leakage is,
capitation  grants received
intended  capitation  grants from the center  (31
where a low value indicates a large leakage.
In theory, the denominator in (3.1), the intended capitation grants from the center, should
be the product of the number of students  in the school and the per-student  capitation  grant.
A closer examination  of records at  the Ministry  of EducatiAppendixon,  however, revealed
two sources of discrepancy from this  formula.  First, the growth in enrollment at the school
level differed considerably from the central government statistics  (see Reinikka, 2001, for a
detailed discussion). Second, for the entire survey period (1991-95) the capitation  grant was
determined on the basis of the 1991 enrollment.  Thus, the growth in enrollment observed at
the school level over the period did not result in increased  "intended capitation  grants from
the center" for the schools. For these reasons, we derive the denominator  in (3.1) using 1991
enrollment data.
In order to bring out regional differences in the sample more clearly, the traditional  four
regions (North,  East,  West and  Central)  were reconfigured into seven regions (Northwest,
North, Northeast, East, Central, Southwest and West). For each region, two or three districts
were randomly  chosen, together  with  the  capital  city, Kampala,  to  yield  a  sample of 18
districts,  as illustrated  in the appendix  map."'
10The following  18 districts were selected:  Arua, Moyo (Northwest);  Apac, Gulu (North); Soroti, Moroto,
7In the  districts  selected the number of schools visited ranged from 10 to  20.  Bushenyi
had the largest number of primary schools (399 in 1994), while Bundibugyo had the smallest
number of schools (59). In the districts with less than  100 government schools the enumera-
tors visited 10 randomly chosen schools. Where the number of schools was between 100 and
200, 15 schools were randomly  selected for visits, and  in  the districts  with  more than  200
schools, 20 schools were randomly chosen for visits.
Enumerators  were trained  and  closely supervised  by a local research team  and  survey
experts from the World Bank to ensure quality and uniformity of data collection and stan-
dards for assessing recordkeeping at the schools. Standardized forms were used. In addition,
interviewers made qualitative  observations to supplement  the quantitative  data.
Do public resources reach the intended schools? How large is the leakage of public funds
in education?  Answering these  questions  was one of the key challenges when setting-up
the data  collection effort.  Table 3.1 depicts  information on our leakage variable, share of
intended capitation grants received. Strikingly, on average only 13 percent of the total yearly
capitation  grant from the central government reached the school. Eighty-seven percent either
disappeared  or was used for purposes unrelated  to  education."Most  schools received very
little or nothing (roughly 70 percent of the schools). In fact, based on yearly data 73 percent
of the schools received less than 5 percent, while only 10 percent of the schools received more
than 50 percent of the intended funds.
The picture  looks slightly better  when constraining  the  sample to  the last year of the
sample period.  Still, only 22 percent of the total capitation  grant from the central government
reached the school in 1995. Thus, in 1995, for every dollar spent on nonwage education items
by the central government, roughly 80 cents got diverted!
As illustrated  in Table 3.1, there is variation across regions, although the bulk of the vari-
ation is within the regions. The standard  deviation of leakage (share of intended capitation
grants received) across regions is roughly one-third  (9.2) of the average standard  deviation
within regions. 12 The Central  region (including the  capital)  appears  to  be the only region
with significantly lower leakage.' 3 In the next two sections we attempt  to  account  for this
variation within  (and across) regions.
Kapchorwa (Northeast); Jinja, Kamuli, Pallisa (East); Kampala, Mukono, Mubende (Central); Bushenyi,
Kabale  (Southwest);  and  Kabarole,  Hoima, Bundibugyo  (West).
1"The classic argument  of fiscal federalism is that  local governments  can better  match  public goods  and
services to  preferences.  Azfar  and  others  (2000) analyzed  whether  district  and  sub-county  government
officials  in Uganda are aware of household preferences in their jurisdictions,  and whether they  adjust resource
allocations to respond to household  preferences. Their results show that  government  officials at the  national
and  sub-county  levels, but  not  at  the  district  level, are  aware  of household  preferences.  Actual  resource
allocations, however, reflect local preferences only weakly.
1 2The results  are similar when comparing within  and across districts  rather  than  regions.
'3This result  is confirmed when running  regression of leakage on the seven regional dummies.  Only the null
hypotheses of equal regional effects between the  Central  region and  the other six regions can be consistently
rejected.
84.  A  bargaining  model  of  school  expenditures
Below  we set out a simple  bargaining  model to guide the empirical  specification.  The objec-
tive is to show  that sociopolitical  features of the school (parents and teachers) have impli-
cations for the equilibrium  amount of leakage.  The model assumes  that the extent to which
public funds reach the primary schools depends on the bargaining strength of the school
vis-a-vis  the district bureaucracy.
4.1. Basics
Consider a school i, i E I, with ni students. For simplicity  we assume each student (child)
belongs  to a separate household  h. Each (identical)  household  supplies  inelastically  one unit
of labor and earns income  yi. Income is used to finance a private consumption  good ci, and
educational services,  ei.
A household  h with a child in school  i has the following  separable quasi-linear  preference
function:
Uhi  = u(chi)  + ehi ,  (4.1)
where ehi is the (quantity and quality of) educational services  provided to a student h in
school  i, and u(.) is a standard utility function with u' > 0, u" < 0.
We  assume  that ei depends  on both the amount of government-provided  financial  support,
si, and the parents' own contribution,  Eh thi. Thus, ehi =  ei  =  si + nli Eh thi. As an example,
ei could be text books or improved  school  facilities.
The I schools  belong  to a district which receives  a grant g (per student) from the cen-
tral government. The grants are intended for the schools,  but are handled by the district
bureaucracy (or a district official-we will use both terms interchangeably). The district
official  has discretion over the use of the funds and will disburse si = g - xi > 0 per student
to school  i, where xi is leakage. We assume the district official  is an expected profit (rent)
maximizer,  thus he attempts to extract (in expected terms) as much of the public funds as
possible. Formally,  the district official  maximizes,
I
EU° = E Enixi.  (4.2)
i=1
The ni households  and teachers associated with school i form a parent-teacher associ-
ation (PTA)i that is the effective  decisionmaker  at the school." 4 The PTA determines the
14By  assuming  that the PTA is the effective  decisionmaker  and can enforce  its decisions  (section  2 provides
motivations  for this assumption),  we assume away free-riding  problems. Given that  most schools  are fairly
large (median  school  has 429 students), we believe  that while free-riding  may be a problem in reality, it will
not be an important variable in explaining differences  in leakage  across  schools. The reason being that the
additional free-riding  problem caused by increasing  school size from say 300  to 400 (or 500) students is not
likely  to be large. The free-riding  problem may be important when comparing  very small school with large
schools. In the empirical  work we control for school  size.
9contribution schedules ti =  (tli, t2i, ..t.i),  and bargains for resources from the district official
to maximize joint  (household) welfare. Specifically, at  the beginning of the  game the  PTA
receives an offer si. If it accepts,  the game ends and educational  services ei =  Si +  I Eh  thi
(per student)  is produced.
The problem for the PTA  is that  ex ante g is not  known; i.e., g is private information
to the district  official. Alternatively  we could assume that  g is known, but  that  the school
cannot  determine  (without  a costly effort) if their district  has  actually received the funds
from the central government. The PTA only knows that  g is distributed  on the interval [0,  g]
according to the distribution  function F(g).
The  PTA can obtain  information about  both  g, for example by contacting  the central
government, but  this is costly. Let 0 be the school-specific  cost of finding out the true g.
In case the PTA does not  accept the offer, it can exercise its voice option." 5 Voice can
take many forms (see Hirschman, 1970), including individual or collective petition  and/or
appeal to  a higher authority,  including local chiefs, or through  various types of actions and
protests.  There  is a  cost  c,  defined in per-student  terms,  to  launch  a  protest.  We can
conceptualize  t,  in  a variety  of ways.  In order to  initiate  a  (successful) protest  the  P'TA
(most likely) must disseminate the information about g to the parents; it must  (most likely)
build a coalition for action within the school, it might need to formulate an  appeal to the
Ministry of Education,  and provide political contributions.  All these actions are costly
A protest  is successful with  probability 7r, in which case all intended  funds (g) are dis-
bursed to the school. With probability  1 - 7r the protest is not successful and the PTA will
end up with si.  7r is assumed to be exogenously given 7r E (0,1).
The timing of events are as follows. First,  the PTA receives an offer si from the district
official and  sets PTA fees ti.  The  PTA can either  accept the  offer or reject it.  In case it
rejects  the offer, it  can invest 6 to  find out  the true  g,  and,  if optimal,  exercise its voice
option (launch a protest).  The order of events is as follows.
Timing  of  events
(a) set school fees
PTA:  (b) obtain information of entitlement  [yes, no]
(c) if yes, form coalition and exercise voice option  [yes, no]
District:  (a) provide funds to schools
Nature:  (d) nature  draws 7r
4.2.  Equilibrium  leakage
How much of the intended funds will the district  official  transfer to the school, and what fac-
tors make leakage more likely? The problem can be solved by working backwards.  Consider
" 5In  reality,  parents  may  also  use their  exit  option;  i.e., move their  children  to  another  school/district.
As discussed below, for our  sample  of public schools, this  option is likely to be  less relevant  due to limited
residential mobility in the  presence of poorly  functioning  land  markets  and  the  scarce supply of schocils in
the rural  areas.
10a PTA who has invested H. Clearly, it will find it optimal to launch a protest if the expected
gain, 7rg  + (1 -r)si  - is larger than the certain payoff si. That  is if,
g9>9-Si  +  r  (4.3)
Condition  (4.3) can be re-stated  as,
7r (g - si)  - > 0.  (4.4)
If the  expected gain  per  student  of a  protest,  the  first  term  in  (4.4), is larger  than  the
expected cost per student,  the PTA will launch a protest.
In the  first stage, the  PTA will decide to  incur the information cost if its expected net
benefit of doing so is nonnegative, that  is,
f sif(g)dg + J  [7rg  + (1 -7r)si  - n] f(g)dg  - 0/ni  > si . (4.5)
The left-hand  side  (LHS) of (4.5) represents  the  expected  income when 0 is incurred,
while the right-hand  side is the (certain)  level of funding per student  in the absence of the
information investment.  Equation  (4.5) can be rewritten  as,
[7r  (g - si) - E,]  f(g)dg  > 0/ni,  (4.6)
which clearly illustrates  the consequence of an unknown g.  Only if the expected net  gain
per student  of a protest  is sufficiently large, (LHS) of (4.6), will the PTA incur the cost of
acquiring and disseminating information about public funding.
Equation  (4.6) is a necessary condition for incurring the  information cost.  In addition,
there is a liquidity constraint.  The PTA must be able to  afford the information investment
and protest  cost. That  is,
nir + 0 <  E  thi  (4.7)
h
At the beginning of the game, the PTA chooses the contribution schedule ti. All individ-
uals in a school district  are identical.  With quasi-linear utility, equilibrium school funding is
simply
thi  =  ti  =  y-  (1)  (4.8)
Consider next the district  official's problem.  By choosing a si such that  (4.6) binds, the
official  can ensure that  no protest will be voiced by the PTA. This will be an optimal response
provided that  the upper  bound on the expected  grant g  (g) is not  too  large.  Specifically,
if g =  g, which is the case if g is known but  that  the school cannot  determine  (without  a
costly effort) if the district  has received all funds from the central government, it is optimal
to choose si so (4.6) binds.  Extracting  more resources will lead the  PTA to  invest 0 and
protest,  which yields strictly  lower expected  utility  for the  district  official.  By extracting
less, the official simply gives up rents to the school.
11with  costly  information  - - - with  costless  information
Figure 4.1: s! as a function of #i.
Proposition  1. If 7r  is sufficiently  large, there exists an equilibrium  without  protest in which
funding to the school (leakage)  si is a non-increasing  function of the information  cost 0 and
the protest cost K,  and a non-decreasing  function of average  income yi and the size of the
school, ni.
Proof.  See appendix.  -
The intuition for the results summarized  in proposition 1 is straightforward. The cost of
acquiring  information  and the cost of exercising  voice  have direct bearing on the cost-benefit
decisions  in (4.4) and (4.6). As 0 is fixed, a larger school implies lower per-student costs
of acquiring information. Lower  per student costs in turn implies that the district official
must disburse  more funds ex ante to avoid  a protest. Parental income influences  equilibrium
leakage  through the liquidity constraint. Higher parental income implies that  (4.4) is less
likely  to bind. The school can then threaten to initiate a protest.
An implication of proposition 1 is that  if income is too low or the  cost of acquiring
information  is too high, the school  may end up with no funding. In this case, condition  (4.4)
may still hold with strict inequality, implying that a well informed  school would initiate a
protest (net gain of protest >  0).  However,  because the cost of acquiring information may
be too high, the school  chooses  not to invest 9. As a result, the district official  can divert all
funds. An example  of such an outcome is illustrated in Figure 4.1.
This simple  model  illustrates  two crucial  points. First, information  on central government
spending allocations can be misleading  in explaining  outcomes, in particular when institu-
tions and oversight  in the public sector are weak. That is, g and s may differ substantially.
Second,  the equilibrium  amount of leakage  x* is a function  of the school's relative bargaining
12strength vis-a-vis the district bureaucracy.
5.  Extensions
Before proceeding to specify an empirical model, it is useful to consider relaxing some of the
simplifying assumptions in the model. This is important  to better  understand  the empirical
findings presented below and  our choice of empirical strategy.
The stylized model set up in section 4 identifies a set of cost factors as important determi-
nants of leakage. These cost factors in turn are determined by various school-specific  factors,
such as the quality of the school leadership and the social cohesion in the school/community.
It  is plausible that  a  school with  skilled leadership  will require  less resources to  acquire
information and  initiate  a protest.  The social network determines the cost of agreeing, co-
ordinating,  and  minimizing  free-riding problems in the  case of a  protest."6 Other  (partly
unobservable) factors that  may influence the school's bargaining strength  vis-a-vis the dis-
trict are distance to district headquarters,  whether or not the school is located in an area that
supported  the  (local) government, and access to media.  In the empirical  work we attempt
to measure some of these underlying determinants  of rc and S. As several of them are time
invariant (at least in a 5-year perspective), we can deal with the potential  omitted variable
problem by using school-specific fixed effects. 17
In  the  model,  students  cannot  choose which  school to  attend  (or not  attend  at  all).
Allowing multiple school choices may result in local sorting that  would influence the observed
relationship between n and  x.  While this  is a serious concern in principle, as discussed in
section 2, we believe it to  be less of a concern in reality for the  survey period.  For most
parents and students  there was little choice with respect  to primary school.1 8 Only in some
urban  areas did  parents  have a  choice where to send their  children,  so the sorting bias  is
likely to be small.
The model takes the location of schools as given. In reality school construction is endoge-
nous. In education systems like Uganda's  where local financing is important,  more affluent
communities can afford to build more schools (or support  private schools), suggesting fewer
students  per school in richer communities (cf.  Duflo, 2000).  Parents  in these communities
are likely to be more educated, have better  political and  bureaucratic  access, and thus have
" 6Studies  on the role of social  networks  in overcoming  coordination  problems  and reducing  transaction
costs in developing  countries include Narayan and Pritchett,  1999 and Wade, 1988.  To the extent that
ethnic ties proxy for social networks, Miguel (2000) argues that  ethnically diverse communities  are less
able to ensure enough social  pressure for sustaining  primary school contributions in rural western  Kenya. In
related work  Gugerty and Miguel  (2000)  show  that higher  ethnic diversity  is associated with lower  community
participation  in school meetings.  Anecdotal  evidence suggests that  similar mechanisms  apply to most  parts
of Uganda.
" 7It  seems implausible  to assume  that  the  omitted  variables are  orthogonal  to our  set  of regressors.  See
Miguel (2000) on the relationship  between  ethnicity  and private  contributions.
1 8An important  explanation  for this  is simply the limited  number  of schools in most  rural  areas, which in
turn  can be traced  back to the  tumultuous  period in the  1970s and  early  1980s.
13a better  chance to  capture  its  share of local funding.  This  non-randomness  in school con-
struction  would bias the coefficient on school size downward. Empirically, we deal with the
sorting problem and the non-randomness in school construction by instrumenting  for school
size.
We have not allowed any heterogeneity across districts.  The focus on school and commu-
nity characteristics  seems relevant given that  the bulk of the variation in leakage is within
districts  (region).  However, it is feasible that  for instance  high-income districts  are better
run  (lower leakage) and that  processes at the district  level, rather  than  at the school level,
make it harder  for officials to  divert funds.  At  the extreme, all variation  in leakage could
stem from district  characteristics.  This  alternative hypothesis is tested  below.
6.  Specification
The model identifies four explanatory variables ni,  ,i,  9i, and yi. Generically, our empirical
model can thus be stated  as
X*  t = X(nijt,  Oijt, Kijt, yijt)  +  ijt  ,  (6.1)
where subscripts  i, j,  t  refer to school, district,  and year, respectively, and  Eijt is an error
term.  Below we discuss how we attempt  to measure the variables in (6.1).
Only one of the explanatory  variables in (6.1) is directly observable, namely the number
of students  (nit).  Thus, nit is measured as the number of students  in primary  school (P1-
P7) i at  time t,  denoted  by students.  We do not  have data  on parental  income.  However,
we do have information  on parents'  financial involvement in  the school.  PTA  income is
the  average  (per  student)  contribution  by parents  to  the  school.  In the  simple model of
section 4 there is a one-to-one relationship between y and t.  Thus, increased income implies
larger contributions  to the school at the margin.  The cost variables  ci and 9i are proxied by
two variables.  The first proxy is a time-variant  measure of the quality  of the  school/PTA
leadership,  defined as the number  of qualified teachers  to  the  total  number  of teachers  in
the school (share of qualified teachers). This  is a suitable proxy if formal education  signals
competence and  competence determines the  amount of resources that  must  be invested to
ac(luire information and  voice a  complaint.  The second proxy is a time-invariant,  school-
specific effect 77i.  As discussed in section 5, many of the underlying determinants  of ti  and
Oi, such as degree of social cohesion, political  access, and  distance to district  headquarters,
can (in the short run) be treated as fixed. A detailed description of all variables are provided
in appendix 2.
Obviously, when estimating the determinants  of xit, it is necessary somehow to scale the
level of leakage. As indicated earlier, the most natural  approach is to define leakage as share
of grants received by school i  at  time  t  to  what  the school should have received (s/g)ijt.
14Log-linearizing (6.1), our empirical model is then,
log ( )  =  fio  + ,1 log qualified  teachersit  + /32 log  PTA incomeit
+±3  log studentsit + wity + vi + pt + Eijt,  (6.2)
where w is a vector of other controls, ,ut is a time-specific effect, and  eijt is an error term.
We allow for district  and  year-specific random effects.  Thus,  eijt  =  Eit +  £jt,  where Eit is
an idiosyncratic error  term and  ejt is a random district  (j)  and year (t) effect.  The model
suggest that  31,  12,  13  >  0. Note that  ()  is censored from below; i.e., s > 0. For further
references, let zit =  [log qualified teachersit, logPTA incomeit, log students 2t].
7. Results
Before proceeding, it is useful to  take  an initial look at the sample.  Some schools did not
report data for all five  years, either due to missing records for these years or because the school
was not operational  in the earlier years.  Excluding a handful of misrecorded  observations,
we ended up with roughly 950 observations for 239 school.
Descriptive statistics  are reported  in Table 7.1 and  Figure  7.1.  In the sample, average
school size is 492 students.  There  are large variations,  however, with  the  smallest school
having 35 students  and the largest one having roughly 100 times as many. The distribution
is illustrated  in Figure  7.1.  The  average student/teacher  ratio  is 32 students  per  teacher,
with  68 percent of the  teachers being qualified. Thirty-four  schools (14 percent),  reported
that  they did not have any qualified teachers for at least one year during the sample period.
Only 13 schools had only qualified teachers at least one year during the sample period, and
only one school had only qualified teachers during the whole sample period.
Parents  contributed  on  average US$10  (in  1990 prices)  to  school expenditures.  The
data,  however, again reveal  large variations.  Twenty-seven schools (11 percent)  reported
no supplementary income from the  parents in any year in which data  were reported,  while
there are 44 school-year observations (5 percent) with PTA  income per student above US$50.
The median yearly contribution  per student  is US$1.60.  As with  the leakage variable, the
variation in PTA  income per student,  share of qualified teachers, and  school size is mainly
within the districts  (regions).
7.1.  Basic  findings
We start  by looking at  the  simple relationship  between leakage and  the school character-
istics,  recognizing that  there  are several econometric  issues, including  censoring, sorting,
endogeneity, and measurement  problems, that  have not  yet been addressed.  We deal with
these concerns in the following subsections.
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Figure 7.1: Cumulative distribution  of explanatory  variables
As a reference point, Table 7.2, column 1, reports  a cross-section regression; i.e., equation
(6.2) without school-specific fixed-effects. The share of qualified teachers enters significantly
an(d with the predicted sign.  PTA  income per student also enters with the right sign, but  is
not significant at standard  significance levels. The variable school size, however, enters with
a  negative sign.  These  results  provide some weak support  for the  bargaining  hypothesis.
However, given that  we do not control for any (time invariant) school/community  character-
istics, the results  should be viewed accordingly. If the school-specific effects are correlated
with the vector Zit,  the coefficients suffer from omitted variable biases.
Columns 2-5 report  the results  of estimating  (6.2) with fixed-effects least squares.  The
first three columns show the partial effect of PTA  income per student, share of qualified  teach-
ers, and school size, on the share of intended capitation grant received, controlling for other
(tine  invariant)  community characteristics.  All three  variables  enter with  predicted  signs
and  are highly significant, suggesting that  local sociopolitical factors influence the schools'
bargaining powers, and  thus  the degree of leakage of public funds.  The base regression is
depicted in column (4).  As evident,  the variables are both  individually and jointly  highly
significant, and the estimated  effects are quantitatively  important.  A 1-percent increase in
school size reduces leakage by 0.8 percent.  Similarly a 1-percent  increase in PTA support
16(higher parental  income) increases the amount of public funding that  reaches the school by
0.3 percent,  and a 1-percent increase in the share of qualified teachers raises the amount of
public funding that  reaches the school by 0.4 percent.
Table 7.2 also reports  two specification tests.  F is the  F ratio  for the  null hypothesis
that  all school-effects (77i)  are equal.  H is the Hausman  (1978) test statistic  for testing the
hypothesis  that  71i  and  Zit  are uncorrelated;  that  is, a test for fixed or random effects. As
evident, both  hypotheses can be soundly rejected, thus providing support  for our choice of
a fixed effect estimator.
The preliminary findings reported  in Table 7.2 support the main hypothesis of the paper:
the equilibrium amount of leakage is a function of the schools' relative bargaining strength.
The bargaining power, in turn,  is a function of (average) parental  income, school size, the
quality of the school leadership, and a set of (time invariant) community/school  characteris-
tics.  In section 4 we provide a plausible explanation for why these variables should matter.
Acquiring information and  initiating  a protest  are costly actions.  Schools with students of
relatively wealthy parents are more likely to be able to afford these costs.  The skill-level of
the school leadership determines the investment costs (0, tv),  and to the extent  that  the costs
are partly  fixed, the per-student  cost is also inversely related  to  school size.  The school-
specific effects capture  fixed factors such as degree of social cohesion, political  access, and
distance to district  headquarters.  The data shows that  these fixed factors are also important.
In the following  subsections we show that  these qualitative results are robust.
7.2.  Censoring  and  time  effects
Table  7.3 reports  the  same set  of regressions estimated  by maximum  likelihood  (MLE).
With  censored data fixed-effects least squares is inconsistent.  All coefficients remain highly
significant.  As expected, the MLE estimates  are larger than  the fixed-effects least squares
estimates.  A simple comparison, however, is misleading since the unscaled coefficient vector
(J 3MLE)  only captures dQ /dzit  Itt  > 0- The left column of Figure 7.2 plots dE (g),t /dzit;
that  is, the expected marginal effect on grants  received to what  should have been received
of an increase in the explanatory  variables.  The right column of Figure  7.2 plots the same
derivatives dE (g)it /dzit  for all but  the top  10-percentile observations.  All derivatives are
evaluated  at the mean of the explanatory  variables.  For most schools, that  is for smaller
schools, schools in poorer  communities, and  schools with relatively  few qualified teachers,
the marginal impact is small.
With school-specific fixed effects, 3,, is identified from the deviation from school means.
This identification strategy  may be problematic  if all variables have a common time trend.
On the other hand, the data  is noisy and including time effects places a strong restriction on
the data.  As shown in column (5), the effects remain intact  when adding time  effects. The
coefficients are jointly  highly significant, although  the coefficient estimates  on PTA  income
per student and share of qualified teachers are smaller.  With time  effects, PTA  income per
student becomes marginally insignificant (at the 10-percent level).
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Figure 7.2: Marginal effects  (in %)  of changes in explanatory variables, dE (I),, /dzi,.  Left
column: all sample.  Right column:  sample excluding top  10-percentile observations [Table
7.3, column (4)].
187.3.  Self-selection,  endogeneity  and  measurement  errors
Until now we have relied on the restrictions  of the  model to estimate  the relationship be-
tween leakage and  the schools' bargaining  strength.  However, as argued above, the  model
is restricted  in that  the agents' action space is reduced  to exercise "voice". In reality, par-
ents may also use their  "exit option".  Specifically, poorly financed schools (schools suffering
from extensive leakage) may not  be able to attract  many students.  That  is, students  may
self-select into well financed schools and/or  may choose not to attend  poorly funded schools.
If this is the case, the estimated  relationship between school size and the share of intended
capitation grant received  suffers from a sorting bias that  would bias the coefficient on school
size upward.  On the other hand,  in education systems relying on local financing, more af-
fluent communities can afford to build more schools (or support  private schools), suggesting
fewer students  per  school in  richer communities.  Parents  in these communities are likely
to be more educated, have better  political and bureaucratic  access, and thus have a better
chance  to capture  its  share of local funding.  This  non-randomness in school construction
would bias the coefficient on school size downward. We deal with the potential  sorting and
non-randomness  biases by instrumenting  for school size using district  population  data  (de-
noted  by  district population).  While  there  might  be some sorting  within  given districts,
there  is very limited  mobility across districts.  Likewise, to  the  extent  that  the variation
in school construction  intensity  is mostly local,  district population mitigates  the potential
non-randomness bias.
Using instrument  techniques also addresses another  significant estimation  issue, the im-
pact  of "noisy" data.  The  problem  with  non-sampling  measurement  errors  is a  general
concern when using micro-level data.  While there are no strong incentives for the school to
misreport  the number of students  in its own records, measurements or recording errors can
still be expected.1 9 The district-level population  data  should serve to mitigate the effects of
measurement error, since we generally think of these errors as being largely idiosyncratic to
the school.
In principle, the estimated relationship between share of qualified teachers and the share
of intended capitation grant received suffers from a similar sorting  bias:  qualified teachers
might self-select into well-financed schools. However, teachers could not shop around for jobs
themselves because the appointments  during the sample period were made by the districts.
Teachers had limited choice about choosing which schools to work in within a district.  Good
(qualified) teachers could try to get into private primary schools, but since our sample consists
of only public schools this selection problem is less of a concern. The allocation of (quality)
teachers across schools within a district may be partly determined by the relative bargaining
strength  of the schools. 20 However, to  the extent  that  our explanatory  variables n,  y, and
1 9ft is plausible  that the incentive  to exaggerate  the number  of students  is stronger  for  small  schools,  thus
introducing  a bias that would  mask negative relationship between  school  size and leakage.
20It  is worth noting that  with respect to the hiring of teachers, the central government (Ministries of
Education and Public Service and the Teacher Service Commission)  clearly exercised  some oversight over
the district educational officers  and district education service commissions.
19the school-specific effects 27  capture  the relative bargaining strength  of schools this will not
cause a problem.  Only to the extent  that  there are time-variant  school-specific  effects that
influence both  the allocation of teachers across schools and the share of intended capitation
grant received will the  coefficient on share of  qualified teachers be  affected.  We therefore
choose to treat  the share of qualified teachers as exogenous.
In the model PTA  income per student is an endogenous variable, although in a one-to-one
relationship with y. In a more general set-up, however, parents'  contributions  would depend
on both income and amount of funds received from the district.  For a given yj, well-financed
schools (low leakage) will receive less contributions  from the parents  (substitution  effect).
This endogenous response will tend to mask the positive relationship between PTA income
per student and  share of intended capitation grant received, and  thus  work against us.  In
addition,  PTA  income per student may also be measured with  error.  These problems may
be mitigated  by instrumenting  for PTA  income per student.  Our instrument  (denoted by
mean consumption) is created in  three steps using household expenditure  data.  The  1992
Integrated Household Survey data  (IHS 1992) provide the basis for the instrument.  First, the
IHS 1992 were used to derive district  mean consumption levels in  1992.21  Second, since the
survey data  are not representative  at the district  rural-urban  level, we use the statistically
robust ratio between urban  and rural consumption at the regional level (central, east, west,
north) as a scale factor to decompose mean district consumption into mean district urban and
mean district  rural consumption.  Finally, while subsequent  household survey sample sizes
were too small to be representative  at the district  level, they  are large enough to  robustly
capture  regional (central, east, west, north)  differences. Thus,  average annual growth rates
from 1992-95 were calculated using data  on regional-urban-rural  mean consumption  levels.
The  average annual  growth rate  over the  period was then  used  to  infer the  urban-rural-
district mean consumption levels in 1991. Combining the growth data  for 1991-95 with the
district  mean  consumption levels in  1992, we derived our instrument:  mean  consumption
levels across district-urban-rural  location in 1991-95.
Table 7.4 depicts the first-stage  regressions.  The instruments  perform well.  Mean con-
sumption  [district population] is a  significant predictor  of PTA  income per student  [school
size]. In both regressions, the instruments  pick up roughly 3 percent  of the variation in the
explanatory variables.
To deal with  the  censoring and  the  selection/measurement  problems  we estimate  the
modlel by conditional  maximum likelihood. 22 The  results  are given in Table  7.5.  The  IV-
estimates are significantly larger than  the ML-results given in Table  7.3.  The large coeffi-
cient on school size suggests that  selection issues are of less concern, but  that  the ML-results
suffer from a measurement error bias  and possibly a bias  due to  non-randomness  in school
construction.  Under plausible  assumptions,  both  these types  of biases push  the estimates
toward zero.  Similarly, measurement  and  simultaneity  problems mask  the relationship  be-
21We  wish  to thank Simon  Appleton  for providing  some  of these  data.
22The  conditional  log-likelihood  function  for a simultaneous  limited  dependent  variable  model  is given  in
Smith  and Blundell  (1986).
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Figure  7.3:  Marginal  effects (in  %) of changes  in  explanatory  variables  (IV-estimates),
dE (g)it ldzit.  Left column:  all sample.  Right column:  sample excluding top  10-percentile
observations [Table 7.5, column (2)].
21tween income and  share of intended  capitation grant received  in Table 7.3. These problems
are mitigated  when instrumenting  for PTA  income per student. 23 As evident  from column
(2), the results  remain intact when including time-effects, although the coefficient estimates
are smaller. 24
The simultaneous  limited dependent  variable estimates are qualitatively  large, also -or
smaller schools and schools with less wealthy parents.  Figure 7.3 (left column) again plots
dE (9)it /dzit, with the right column depicting the derivatives for all but the top 10-percentile
observations.  A 1-percent increase in school size (evaluated at the mean of all explanatory
variables)  reduces  leakage by 2 percentage  points.  A  1-percent increase in  PTA support
increases the amount  of public funding that  reaches the  school by 0.25 percentage points,
and a 1-percent increase in the share of qualified teachers reduces leakage by 0.27 percent.
To summarize, once dealing with potential measurement, endogeneity, and selection prob-
lems, we find the identified school characteristics have a quantitatively  large impact on the
degree of leakage.
7.4.  Additional  robustness  tests
We ran a number of additional  robustness tests  on the results reported  above. One concern
is outliers.  Until now, we have taken  an  extremely conservative approach  with respect  to
outliers:  only a few observations, which seem quite  clearly to  be a result  of misrecording,
have been dropped.  However, some fairly serious outliers remain.  In particular,  there  are
17 [3] observations on PTA  income per student  [school size] taking  values of more than  3
standard  deviations above the mean.  While there is no theoretical justification  for deleting
these observations, it would be of considerable concern if our results were completely driven
by them.  To examine this  possibility, we dropped  all observations on school  size  and  PTA
income  per  student  with  values larger than  3 standard  deviations  above the mean.  The
results are similar to those reported  above.
We added  additional  controls, including  the students-teacher  ratio  and  the  tuition  fee
per student.  Adding these variables did not change the results.  Only tuition  fee per student
had some explanatory  power, as can be seen from Table 7.6, column (1). All other variables
remain unchanged.
In column  (2) we add  the  district-based  instrument  variables  mean  consumption  and
district  population  to the basic regression. When instrumenting, the parameters are identified
solely based on variation across districts.  One might expect  that  there  are processes at the
district  level, rather  than  at  the  school level,  which influence the  degree of leakage and
thus explain  our results.  Specifically, it  is plausible  that  our instruments,  district  inconle
23We note a similar pattern by comparing the fixed-effects  least squares results in Table 7.3, with the
two-stage,  fixed-effects  least squares estimation (results available  upon request).
241t is worth noting that if share of qualified  teachers  also is measured with error, the resulting attenuation
bias pushes the estimate toward zero. Thus, the estimates in Table 7.5 are most likely  to constitute a lower
bound on the effects  of a more qualified  teaching staff.
22and  size, could  directly  influence the  officials' possibilities to  divert  funds;  that  is,  they
have an  independent  effect on  s.  However, once controlling for the set  of school-specific
9
characteristics,  the  evidence suggests that  these  district  characteristics  are unimportant.
The proxy for district  income (district mean consumption level) even enters with a negative
sign. The finding that  the share of intended capitation grant received  does not appear to be
driven by these district  specific variables is important  and suggests that  they are suitable as
instruments.  The result also supports the maintained  assumption of the paper:  to focus on
school/community  characteristics.
8.  Conclusion
In this paper we have provided, to our knowledge, the first quantitative assessment of leakage
in a large public expenditure program in a developing country. Even though the institutional
environment in  Uganda  is not  identical  to other  low-income (Sub-Saharan  African) coun-
tries, we believe our estimate of leakage can nevertheless be viewed as a first approximation
of similar programs  elsewhere.  Furthermore,  we have argued that  resource flows (leakage)
are endogenous to school characteristics.  Rather  than being passive recipients of flows from
government, schools use their bargaining power vis-a.-vis  other parts of government to secure
greater shares of funding.  Resources are therefore not allocated according to the rules under-
lying government budget decisions, with substantial  equity and efficiency implications.  One
implication of this  finding is that  estimates of the actual budget allocation across end-users
(in this  case schools), requires an understanding  of the local political economy. In the case
of school funding in Uganda we have argued that  this involves studying the bargaining game
between the intended  user (school) and  the provider of funds (the district  officials). Three
variables seem important  in explaining the variation of leakage across schools: school size,
income, and the extent to which teachers are qualified. Our results also indicate that  a large
part of the variation in leakage can be explained by (time invariant) school/community  char-
acteristics.  Identifying what  characteristics matter  is an important  area for future research.
As  an  example, anecdotal  evidence indicates  that  the headmaster's  relationship  with
district  officials was an  important  factor in obtaining  funding  from the local government.
Similarly, academically well-performing schools were often favored by district officials because
they projected a positive image of them and the district  as a whole. Well-performing schools
attracted  visitors from  the center.  Local officials, in turn,  rewarded them  by transferring
more capitation  grants.  These anecdotes are consistent  with the school survey data  which
show that,  despite dismal spending outcomes overall, some schools were able to obtain most
of their intended capitation  grants.
The contribution  of this  paper is not  only empirical.  A methodological contribution  is
the design of a new survey tool-the  quantitative  service delivery survey-that  can be used
to gather  data on government resource flow and frontline service delivery. In countries with
poor accounting systems and in the absence of incentives to maintain adequate administrative
23records, such a  survey can provide policymakers with  valuable information both  on inputs
and outputs  of the service delivery system.  In addition,  information  disseminated directly
to the public can play a critical role in improving spending outcomes.  In fact, the Uganda
survey findings prompted a strong response from the central government.  It began to publish
monthly transfers  of public funds to  districts  in newspapers  and broadcast  them  on radio.
It  also required primary  schools to  post notices on all inflows of funds.  On the one hand,
these measures aimed  at  empowering the  user by lowering the  cost of information  0, and
strengthening  the schools' bargaining  position vis-a-vis the districts,  whereas on the other
hand, they aimed at changing the nature  of the game by strengthening  the oversight by the
central government.  Hence, instead of a bargaining  game between the schools and  district
bureaucracies,  the  new  situation  could be  described  as a principal-agent  game, with  the
central government as principal.
An initial  assessment  of these reforms  suggests hugely improved  outcomes  (Republic
of Uganda,  2000).  Instead  of about  20 percent  in  1995 over 90 percent  of the  intended
capitation  grants  reached the  schools in 1999.  These qualitative  results  are in accordance
with the bargaining  model presented.  By lowering the cost of accruing information 0, the
school's bargaining position improves, thus leading to lower leakage.
Similar quantitative  service provider surveys are presently being implemented in Ghana,
Honduras, Mozambique, and Tanzania, and several others are likely to follow suit.  We have
shown that  the type of data  collected with  such tools on local public goods provision can
be used to analyze problems in service delivery systems in developing countries and, in the
end, improve policy and outcomes.
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9. Appendix
9.1.  Proof  of proposition  1
Let 9* = g - -:  that  is, s  is the si such that  (4.4) binds.  Consider the case when the school
has made the information investment 0. If si <  the PTA will choose to initiate  a protest
and the  official's expected  payoff is  (1 -7r)(g  - si).  If si  > 9* the  PTA will not  protest
and the official's expected payoff is g - si.  Clearly the official will then either  choose si = 0
(in which case the school will protest),  or si =  9! thereby avoiding a protest.  Ensuring no
protest  by providing funding si  is optimal if
E [xi I  no protest]  - E [xi I protest] = 7rg  - > 0.  (9.1)
27Condition  (9.1) is most likely to hold when 7r is large. Thus, for sufficiently high 7r, the
official will ensure enough funding so that  no protest will be initiated.
Consider now the situation  before the PTA makes its  choice whether  or not  to acquire
information about g.  Let  52  be the cutoff value of si implicitly defined by (4.5). That  is,
[7z  (g - 9*) - ,] f(g)dg - 0/n =  0  j'9.2)
Comparing  (9.2) and  (4.5) it is obvious that  52  <  91.  Thus,  if the district  official offers
si <  St  the PTA will invest 0 (per student) and once g is knows also initiate  a protest.  If 7r  is
sufficiently high this will result in expected payoff (1 - 7r)(g  - si) which is strictly lower than
g-s*.  Thus, provided that  the credit constraint  (4.7) does not bind, equilibrium leakage is
given by x2  =  g -
Differentiating (9.2) yields,
ds  _  0
dn  n2A  -





A =  [7  (g  - r2)  ] f (9) +  7  rf (g)dg > O
Substituting  (4.8) into the credit constraint  (4.7), yields
r,+  0/ni  <yi  - u-'1()  (9.3)
Clearly  (9.3) holds for a  wider range of parameter  values r, and  0  the  larger  average
income yi.
9.2.  Data  description
*  average share of  teachers =  average share  of qualified teachers  to  total  number  of
teachers in the district-urban-rural  location.
*  district population =  district  population  (source:  Bureau  of Statistics,  Republic  of
Uganda).
* mean consumption =  mean consumption level in the district-urban-rural  location (source:
constructed  using the 1992-1995 Uganda Household Surveys data).
* PTA  income per student = real PTA total  income in US 1990 dollars/number  of stu-
dent  (adjusted  for inflation using end of year calendar  data  from the Department  of
Statistics).
28*  school size = number of students  in P1-P7.
*  share of intended capitation grant received  = capitation  grant received as share of what
should have been received. The amount that  should have been provided is based on the
number of students  in 1991 (or first year it was recorded), scaled by the ratio between
number of students  in the school according to the survey and the number of students
in the school according to official statistics  in  1991.
*  share of qualified teachers = share of qualified teachers to total  number of teachers.
*  students-teacher ratio = students-teacher  ratio.
29Table 2.1.  School  income data, 1991-95
(1991 prices in millions of U Sh)
1991  1992  1993  1994  1995
Govemment  539.8  437.1  606.9  1,017.7  1,202.9
Teacher salaries  213.9  214.7  381.3  748.6  914.6
Capitation grants  252.1  159.9  152.0  150.4  141.2
Rehabilitation  and  73.8  62.5  73.6  118.7  147.1
other
Parents (PTA)  772.3  840.5  1,087.8  1,371.8  1,649.9
PTA levies  591.1  609.6  775.2  934.9  1,032.7
Teacher salaries  125.8  134.1  196.0  300.7  475.9
Tuition fees  55.4  96.8  116.6  136.2  141.3
Total  1,312.1  1,277.61  1,694.7  2,389.5  2,852.8
(percent)
Government  100  100  100  100  100
Teacher salaries  40  49  63  74  76
Capitation grants  47  37  25  15  12
Rehabilitation  and  13  14  12  11  12
other
Parents (PTA)  100  100  100  100  100
PTA levies  77  73  71  68  63
Teacher salaries  16  16  18  22  29
Tuition fees  7  11  11  10  8
Total  100  100  100  100  100
Government  41  34  36  43  42
Parents (PTA)  59  66  64  57  58
*Capitation  grants  based  on what  schools  should  have  received;  tuition  fees  are  those  actually  collected
from  parents;  other  items  are  actual  receipts  by  the schools.
Table 3.1. Share of Intended capitation  grant received
(in percent)
Mean  Median  St. dev.  Maximum  Minimum  Obs.
All schools
1991-95  12.6  0  26.7  115.9  0  944
1995  21.9  0  33.7  108.9  0  208
Regions
North  11.5  0  22.8  104.4  0  136
West  11.8  0  25.4  109.8  0  143
Southwest  8.1  0  23.7  101.6  0  131
Northwest  7.6  0  22.8  105.9  0  101
East  11.4  0  25.6  107.2  0  137
Northeast  17.5  0  27.2  108.9  0  146
Central  18.3  0  34.3  115.9  0  150
Region-year average  11.8  0  9.2  36.8  0  35
30Table 7.1. Descriptive statistics
Variable  Mean  Med.  St. dev.  Max.  Min.  Obs.
Number of students  492  429  350  3,828  35  942
Student-teacher  ratio  32.0  31.2  12.3  110  6  942
Percent  qualified teachers  68.4  76.9  29.9  100  0  938
PTA income per student  10.1  1.6  36.4  550.7  0  942
[real 1990 US$]
Table 7.2. Explaining leakage across schools
Equation  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)
Time  1991-95  1991-95  1991-95  1991-95  1991-95
Method  OLS  FE-LS  FE-LS  FE-LS  FE-LS
PTA  income  per student  0.133  0.421  0.336
(.107)  (.096)  (.092)
[.216]  [.000]  [.000]
School size  -0.332  0.828  0.827
(.114)  (344)  (.324)
[.005]  1.018]  [.012]
Share of qualified  teachers  0.093  0.449  0.397
(.054)  (.118)  (.124)
[.0881  [.000]  [.0021
Wald  8.87
[.000]
F  3.59  3.49  3.54  3.68
[.000]  [.000]  [.000]  [.000]
H  12.35  21.72  16.74  43.65
[.0001  [.000]  [.000]  [.000]
No. schools  239  239  239  239  239
No. obs.  938  942  942  938  938
Adi. R2 .02  .39  .39  .39  .42
Note:  Estimation  by OLS  (column  1)  and  fixed-effects  least  squares  (cots.  2-5)  with random  district  and  year
effects.  Dependent  variable  is the share  of intended  capitation  grant  received.  Standard  errors  in
parenthesis  and  p-values  in brackets.  Wald  is  the test statistic  for the null  hypothesis  that  the coefficients  on
PTA  income  per  student,  school  size,  and  share  of unqualified  teachers  are  zero,  with  p-values  reported  in
brackets.  F is  the F-ratio  for the null  hypothesis  that all fixed  effects  are  equal,  with p-values  reported  in
brackets.  H is  the Hausman  (1978)  test  statistic  for the null  hypothesis  that  the fixed  effects  are uncorrelated
with  the explanatory  variables  (z),  with  p-values  reported  in brackets.
31Table  7.3.  Explaining leakage  across  schools:  Limited  dependent  variable estimation
Equation  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)
Time  1991-95  1991-95  1991-95  1995-95  1995-95
Method  MLE  MLE  MLE  MLE  MLE
PTA  income  per student  3.061  2.756  0.932
(.423)  (.423)  (.356)
[.000]  [.000]  [.0091
School size  3.421  3.043  2.754
(.780)  (.713)  (.607)
[.000]  [.000]  [.000]
Share  of qualified  teachers  3.387  2.559  0.559
(.550)  (.511)  (.361)
[.000]  [.000]  [.122]
2.515  2.648  2.551  2.343  1.840
Proportion y > 0  0.26  0.26  0.25  0.25  0.25
LR  120.8  41.23
[.000]  [.000]
Time effects  No  No  No  No  Yes
No. schools  239  239  239  239  239
No. obs.  942  942  938  938  938
Note:  Estimation  by maximum  likelihood.  Dependent  variable  is the  share  of  intended  capitation  grant
received.  Standard  errors  in parenthesis  and  p-values  in brackets.  LR is  the likelihood  ratio  test statistic  for
the null  hypothesis  that  the coefficients  on PTA  income  per  student,  school  size,  and  share  of  unqualified
teachers  are  zero,  with  p-values  reported  in brackets.
32Table 7.4. First-stage  regressions
Equation  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
Time  1991-95  1991-95  1991-95  1991-95
Dep. Variable  PTA  income  School size  PTA income  School size
per student  per student
Method  FE-LS  FE-LS  FE-LS  FE-LS
Mean consumption (district)  1.889  -0.355  1.753  -0.345
(.632)  (.262)  (.622)  (.263)
[.003]  [.176]  [.005]  [.191]
Population (district)  2.6E-5  2.1  E-6  -4.4E-6  1.9E-6
(1.4E-6)  (5.7E-7)  (2.0E-6)  (8.4E-7)
[.053)  t.000]  [.025]  f.023J
Time effects  No  No  Yes  Yes
No. schools  239  239  239  239
No. obs.  942  942  942  942
Adj. R2 0.82  0.90  0.83  0.90
Note:  Estimation  by fixed-effects  least  squares.  Standard  errors  in parenthesis  and  p-values  in brackets.
Table 7.5. Explaining  leakage across schools:  Instrument  techniques
Equation  (1)  (2)
Time  1991-95  1991-95
Method  Conditional MLE  Conditional  MLE
PTA income  per student  5.320  2.055
(1.432)  (1.239)
[.000]  [.098]
School  size  24.76  10.15
(6.213)  (4.586)
[.000]  [.027]
Share of qualified teachers  0.971  0.577
(.373)  (.351)
[.009]  [.101]
Share of qualified teachers
(squared)
vY  2.027  1.839
Proportion y > 0  0.25  0.25
LR  207.2  35.71
[.000]  [.000]
Time effects  No  Yes
No. schools  239  239
No. obs.  938  938
Note:  Estimation  by conditional  maximum  likelihood  (Smith  and Blundell,  1986).  Dependent  variable  is the
share  of  intended  capitation  grant  received.  Standard  errors  in parenthesis  and  p-values  in brackets.  LR is
the likelihood  ratio  test statistic  for  the null  hypothesis  that  the coefficients  on PTA  income  per  student,
school  size,  and  share  of unqualified  teachers  are zero,  with  p-values  reported  in brackets.
33Table 7.6. Explaining  leakage across schools:  Additional  robustness  tests
Equation  (1)  (2)
Time  1991-95  1991-95
Method  MLE  MLE
PTA  income  per student  2.351  0.989
(.425)  (.360)
[.000]  [.0061
School  size  3.186  2.754
(.704)  (.610)
[.000]  [.000]
Share  of qualified  teachers  2.386  0.575
(.507)  (.365)
[.000]  [.116]
Tuition  fee per student  1.676
(.412)
[.0001
Mean  consumption  (district)  -6.916
(6.318)
[.274]
Population  (district)  1  .6E-5
(1.4E-5)
[.2721




Time  effects  No  Yes
No. schools  239  239
No. obs.  938  938
Note:  Estimation  by maximum  likelihood.  Dependent  variable is the share of intended  capitation  grant
received.  Standard  errors  in parenthesis  and  p-values  in brackets.  LR1  is the likelihood  ratio  test statistic  for
the null hypothesis  that the coefficients  on PTA  income  per  student,  school  size,  and share  of  unqualified
teachers  are zero,  with p-values  reported  in brackets.  LR2  is the likelihood  ratio test statistic  for the null
hypothesis  that the coefficients  on mean  consumption  and population  are zero,  with p-values  reported  in
brackets.
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